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Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the relationship between the
later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein' and questions in the philosophy of
law.2 This interest has compelling historical origins. Professor H.L.A. Hart
acknowledged his debt to Wittgenstein in the context of his discussion of legal
rules in The Concept of Law,3 a book commonly considered to be the first
thorough account of legal positivism and perhaps the seminal modem text on
jurisprudential theory. More recently, writers from a very different
tradition-that of legal realism-have begun to turn to Wittgenstein for
inspiration as well.
4
I. By 'later philosophy," I refer to Wittgenstein's work after his rejection of the views expressed in
his first book, LUDWIG WrrrGNSTEIN, TRACrATUS LoGiCO-PHILOSOPIICUS (C.K. Ogden trans..
Routledge 1992) (1922). 1 refer specifically to LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTiGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MacMillan 3d ed. 1968) (1953) thereinafter Wrr-GE.ISTEIN. PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS); and LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON TIHE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHtF.'MATICS (G.H.
von Wright et al. eds. & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MIT Press 1991) (1956) [hereinafter Wr=TGE-STEJN.
REMARKS]. The latter was published posthumously and is comprised of a set of notes that Wittgenstetn
wrote and organized relatively late in his life.
2. See, e.g., Wr1rGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson ed.. 1992) (collecting I I essays
on Wittgenstein's relevance for law); Brian Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of
Scepticism and Law, 33 MCGILL L.J. 451 (1988) (rejecting the argument that the indeterminacy of language
and law can be justified using Wittgenstein's philosophy); Charles M. Yablon. Law and Metaphyswcs. 96
YALE LJ. 613 (1987) (reviewing SAUL A. KRIPKE, Wn-TGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE
AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSmTON (1982)).
3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 249 n.122 (1961); see also P.M.S. Hacker. Harts Philosophy
of Law, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIET.Y: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART I (P.M.S. Hacker & JI
Raz eds., 1977) (reviewing the method and substance of Han's legal theory).
4. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought.
133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985) (developing a method for social and legal theory based on a treatment of
critical legal studies); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory. 94
YALE LJ. 1 (1984) (arguing that traditional legal theory has failed and suggesting an alternative view of
legal theory as a form of political activity); Mark V. Tushnet. Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
ofInterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983) (arguing that interpretivism and
neutral principles fail as theories for interpreting the Constitution).
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In particular, several realist scholars have focused on the legal implications
of Wittgenstein's sustained treatment of rule following in Philosophical
Investigations. There are at least two reasons to think their interest in this
topic is important. First, one might expect that a central task of legal theory
is to explain how it is that we live our lives guided by legal rules. Learning to
bring one's behavior into accord with rules can be understood, on this view,
as a central phenomenon of life under law.6 Second, an account of law in
terms of rules has traditionally been crucial to explaining the legitimacy of the
legal system.7 As one prominent legal realist puts it, "Determinacy is
necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both theorists and judges. It
is the only way judges can appear to apply the law rather than make it.
Determinative rules and arguments are desirable because they restrain arbitrary
judicial power."8 If law does not guide behavior through rules, such theorists
assert, it must guide through unconstrained decisions, leaving people subject
to a system governed by the arbitrary whim and caprice of individual
judges-an illegitimate system.9
Given the importance of legal rules for understanding the legitimacy of the
judicial system, I seek to examine the writing of legal theorists who focus on
Wittgenstein's treatment of rules. I argue that what appears to be a relatively
technical debate about the nature of Wittgenstein's rule-following arguments
and their relevance for law actually brings to light deep and important issues
in the political theory of legal interpretation. An understanding of
Wittgenstein's arguments and their application to law provides insight into a
central dispute concerning the legitimacy of the rule of law.
To that end, I am interested in a debate among legal scholars about the use
that certain legal realists make of Wittgenstein. James Boyle, 0 Mark
Tushnet," and Charles Yablon12 are three prominent theorists from the
realist tradition 3 who use Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to
5. WTTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 1, §§ 143-242.
6. I owe this point to Jules Coleman. Charles Fried attributes the insight to Lon Fuller. See Charles
Fried, Recent Trends in American Legal Theory, in LEGMMACYILIGTMITI 29, 29 (Athanasios Moulakis
ed., 1986) (discussing developments in legal scholarship).
7. There may be those who hold that legitimacy is not a central aspect of jurisprudence. On this view,
a conceptual analysis of law is concerned only with what existing law is, and not with "derivative"
questions such as how law legitimates legal authority. This Note will be of only marginal interest for those
who hold this view.
8. Singer, supra note 4, at 12.
9. Even if not crucial to law's legitimacy in an empirical sense, which may rest on public perceptions
of the legal system that have little to do with what legal theorists say, an account of legal rule following
may still be crucial to any attempt to develop a theory of adjudication that legitimates judicial power.
10. Boyle explicitly traces his argument for indeterminacy to wittgenstein's views on language. See
Boyle, supra note 4, at 707 n.75.
11. Tushnet uses an example of following a simple mathematical rule, which he owes to Wittgenstein
(via Peter Winch). See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 822-23. He then applies his example to judges. See Id.
12. Yablon's whole review attempts to explain how Wittgenstein's arguments, as interpreted by Saul
Kripke, challenge traditional ways of viewing legal rules. See Yablon, supra note 2, passim.
13. I follow Owen Fiss in viewing scholars commonly considered critical legal scholars as part of the
realist tradition. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 741 (1982). Like
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argue that the law is radically indeterminate.' 4 They have been criticized by
several commentators, including Brian Langille,'" Gene Smith, 16 and Andrei
Marmort 7 (whom I will call the "anti-realists"). 8 The anti-realists contend
that the legal realists fundamentally misunderstand the point of the rule-
following arguments. Wittgenstein, they argue, does not argue for the
indeterminacy of language or law; rather, he demonstrates that the conclusion
that language is indeterminate rests on a mistaken picture of how language
operates. In particular, the anti-realists claim that the Wittgensteinian realists
are led astray by Saul Kripke's infamous misreading of Wittgenstein. t9
I believe the anti-realists are right insofar as they claim that Wittgenstein
did not argue for the indeterminacy of rules 20 in Philosophical Investigations.
However, it is significant that Wittgenstein's comments in Philosophical
Investigations are limited primarily to examples from everyday language use
and mathematics. 2' He does not talk about the law explicitly in these
passages, thus leaving open the question of how his theory could be applied
to rule following in the legal context.
I believe many of the parties in this debate have failed to consider exactly
how we should apply Wittgenstein's examples of rule following to law. I do
the realists, critical legal scholars believe in the indeterminacy of legal rules. Cntical legal scholars have
a particular picture of what determines judicial decisions, given that rules do not. For the cntical legal
scholars, this picture is grounded in a Marxian theory of ideology. See Singer. supra note 4. at 22-23 For
my purposes, any theorist who believes in the indeterminacy of legal rules is a legal realist.
14. By "indeterminate," I mean that the facts of a case. together with the relevant legal rules, cannot
determine a unique outcome. According to an indeterminacy theorist. it is always true that given a set of
facts, the legal rules can be used to justify more than one outcome. A conceptual analysis of law, on this
view, will have no substantial explanatory power because multiple conflicting outcomes arc equally
justifiable given the conceptual apparatus of the legal rules in a particular case. (This is one of the ways
in which legal realism and legal positivism are at odds. Many positivists claim to be engaged in a
conceptual analysis of law, while many realists hold that such an analysis cannot illuminate how cases are
decided.)
15. See Langille, supra note 2.
16. See Gene Anne Smith. Witgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, i WITn'GENYSTEIN AND LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 2, at 157.
17. See Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, in WrrrGENSTEIN AND LEGAL TItEORY. supra note 2, at
189.
18. Here I should also mention Brian Bix, The Apphcation (and Afis-Applcanon) of Wttgenstein's
Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory, in WrtrGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY. supra note 2. at
209. Bix does not believe that Wittgenstein can be used to justify legal indeterminacy, but he also thinks
that Wittgenstein's use for grounding legal determinacy is limited. See 1d. at 223 His views are discussed
in detail below. See infra Sections IV.A-B.
19. See KRIPKE, supra note 2. The anti-realists take Kripke's reading to be highly controserstal See.
e.g., Langille, supra note 2, at 463; Smith, supra note 16, at 176 n.63.
20. For present purposes, I define "'rule skepticism" as synonymous with the belief in the
indeterminacy of rules as defined supra note 14. Rule skepticism for Wittgenstem. however, refers to
skepticism about any kind of rules, whereas the indeterminacy theorist is committed only to skepticism
about legal rules. The Wittgensteinian indeterminacy theorists discussed here believe that legal rules are
indeterminate because rules for the use of words in everyday language are indeterminate. However, it is
certainly possible to believe that legal rules are indeterminate even though rules for language are not. I
believe the most plausible reading of Wittgenstein generates precisely that conclusion.
21. See, e.g., WITI'GENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note I. §§ 143. 156. 185. There
are numerous such examples throughout Wittgenstein's work.
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not deny that many of Wittgenstein's comments on language and mathematics
may be fruitfully brought to bear on legal rule following. However, I wish to
draw attention to features of language and mathematics (on Wittgenstein's
account) that the law does not share and that therefore complicate the analogy
drawn by legal realists and anti-realists alike. In particular, I wish to draw a
distinction between Wittgenstein's critique of rule-based models of meaning
and his alternative accounts of how linguistic and mathematical understanding
are really possible. I argue that Wittgenstein's general critique poses deep
problems for accounts of rule following in the law, but that his alternative
accounts of language and mathematics are quite specific to those practices and
therefore offer little help for dealing with the deep problems generated by his
critique as applied to law. The critique of rule following applies to any practice
in which rules generate correctness; in contrast, the alternatives Wittgenstein
suggests in Philosophical Investigations rely on the specific characteristics of
mathematics and language-characteristics that are not easily generalizable to
law.
Langille, Smith, and Marmor fail to recognize that Wittgenstein's
alternative model of correctness has a very limited range of applicability when
they argue that Wittgenstein's work does not justify rule skepticism in law.
Thus, in an interesting way, the legal realists' initially misguided use of
Wittgenstein proves more compelling than it may have first appeared. While
Wittgenstein does not argue, as the realists suggest, for the indeterminacy of
language, his arguments against a rule-based understanding of meaning may
undermine the determinacy of legal rules.
Through the largely negative project of explicating Wittgenstein's critique
of rule following and how it is to be applied to law, I also aim to reveal more
constructive resources within Wittgenstein's work. An examination of
Wittgenstein's considered views on correctness reveals a blueprint for
generating a theory that explains legal correctness by focusing on certain
characteristics that are fundamental to legal practice. While I do not attempt
to provide such a theory here, I hope to point in the direction that such a
theory should take, and to describe some of the minimal constraints on any
Wittgensteinian legal theory. Thus, through an explication of the proper role
for Wittgenstein in the debate about the determinacy of legal rules, I aim to
demonstrate the manner in which the realists' critique can be used
constructively.
In Part I of this Note, I briefly describe the legal realist project in order
to place the Wittgensteinian realists in context. I argue that we should
understand the legal realists as (primarily) advancing an argument against the
legitimacy of the legal system, not an argument against the predictability of
judicial decisions. In Part II, I describe the argument that the Wittgensteinian
realists make, using a detailed exposition of Kripke's treatment of
Wittgenstein's argument. I then explain how these theorists apply
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Wittgenstein's argument to law. In Part II, I describe the account of the anti-
realists and explain their claim that the realists fundamentally misunderstand
the nature of Wittgenstein's arguments about rule following. In Part IV, I
introduce my arguments against the anti-realists. Although I agree that
Wittgenstein can be read as an opponent of skepticism in mathematics and
language, I argue that the Wittgensteinian solution to mathematical and
linguistic indeterminacy cannot be applied to legal indeterminacy."- In
arriving at this conclusion, however, I show that there are resources within
Wittgenstein's method that could be helpful in constructing a new, alternative
theory of legal correctness. In Part V, I consider how we might construct a
Wittgensteinian theory of legal correctness and derive certain constraints that
must apply to any such theory.
Before embarking on this heuristic comparison of rule following in
mathematics, language, and law, I should clarify what I mean by each of these
terms. In general, the examples I use from mathematics deal with very basic
mathematical rules, such as the rule for addition or the rule for continuing a
series of even numbers. Similarly, when I refer to determinacy "in language,"
I refer to the presence (or absence) of certainty (in the minds of most speakers
and listeners) 3 about the meaning of everyday words and sentences, as in
conversation or simple reading.24 When discussing legal determinacy, I have
in mind cases (including those at the appellate level) that interpret statutes and
the Constitution, as well as commentary on those cases.
Here one might object that I use a shifting baseline for comparison when
I compare determinacy in mathematics, language, and law. After all, my
examples from mathematics and language involve simple and uncontroversial
practices, while my focus in law is on the comparatively complex and abstract
use of legal concepts developed by judges and scholars. If I consider addition
in math, one might argue, shouldn't I consider something equally
straightforward in law, such as the rules about page lengths for briefs or the
rules for following speed limits?
This worry rests on a misunderstanding of my project. My aim is not to
compare correctness in mathematics and language to correctness in law. A
global project of that kind would be beyond my competence. Instead, my goal
22. That is to say, although the realists fail in using Wittgenstein to establish linguistic indeterminacy,
Wittgenstein's critique of rule following can be applied to challenge the determinacy of legal rules.
23. When I refer to certainty "in the minds of' speakers and listeners. I mean "certainty" only in the
common sense way in which we think of people being certain about the meaning of phrases they hear or
read. I do not intend to take a position in debates about the metaphysics of linguistic understanding or the
nature of certainty.
24. The fact that my discussion of determinacy in language is about people's ability to understand each
other in everyday conversation and reading should make clear that. for the purposes of this Note,
determinacy in law is not simply a subset of determinacy in language. While legal rules are, of course,
linguistic rules-by virtue of being made of words and written in sentences--they are different from the
sorts of linguistic rules that I aim to use for comparative purposes. Thus. the fact that linguistic rules are
determinate does not entail that legal rules are determinate. See infra note 48: infra Part IV.
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is to see what use Wittgenstein's analysis of mathematics and language may
have for either supporting or answering a critique posed by the legal realists.
The realists ask how judicial decisions can be legitimate if they are not
determinate by virtue of a rule-guided system. Wittgenstein (on my reading)
offers just such an account: an explanation of how mathematics and language
are determinate that does not rely on a rule-guided system.25 My aim is to see
if anything in Wittgenstein's account can aid us in answering the realists'
question.
I remain agnostic about whether Wittgenstein's account, which focuses on
simple mathematical rules and uncontroversial uses of language, can be applied
to other more complex areas of mathematics and language. Wittgenstein may
not even have intended his account of rule following to be applied to other
more complex areas.26 Similarly, I am not interested in an account of legal
rule following that explains only the way in which people follow simple
everyday laws (such as stop signs). The realists want an account that explains
court decisions, not just traffic laws. Whether or not Wittgenstein's account
can satisfy their concern is the guide for my discussion.
I. LEGAL REALISM AND LEGITIMACY
Though I am interested only in a subgroup of legal realists (those relying
on Wittgenstein), it may be helpful to begin by situating this group in the
context of legal realism generally and contextualizing the legal realist project
in terms of legal theory more broadly. I take the core of legal realism to be the
claim that legal rules do not play a key role in determining the outcome of
judicial decisions. In this part, I describe this view and then explain its role in
the realist critique of the legal system more broadly. That critique, at least in
part, aims to attack the legitimacy of the legal system.
There are very few shared views that actually bind the legal realists
together. Nevertheless, all realists appear to discount the importance of legal
rules and principles in determining the outcomes of cases and explaining the
phenomenon of law generally.27 While there is disagreement about what
25. In fact, his account begins with a criticism of the use of rule-guided systems to explain
determinacy. See WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 1, §§ 82-85.
26. Wittgenstein discusses various complex mathematical phenomena extensively in Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics, though it is not clear if he means his remarks about rule following to
encompass all of those phenomena. He may have held the view that no single account of correctness in
mathematics can explain the varied phenomena that fall under the rubric of that discipline. He hints at this
possibility in his discussion of the mathematical use of infinity: "But where is the problem here? Why
should I not say that what we call mathematics is a family of activities with a family of purposes?"
WITr'ENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note I, V-15, at 273.
27. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 261,
261 (J. Raz ed., 1996). Where I refer to "realists," I am referring to legal realists. There are other
philosophical theses identified with realism more generally, but I am not interested here in the relationship
between legal realism and realism in other areas of philosophy. For interesting discussions of realism in
metaphysics, see SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD: GROUNDINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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"really" explains judicial decisions (candidates include political ideologies,
judges' institutional roles, personalities, and other factors, no two of which are
necessarily mutually exclusive),s legal realists all agree that legal rules alone,
when applied to the facts, underdetermine the outcome. As Brian Leiter puts
it, "If the law is rationally indeterminate on some point, then legal reasons
justify more than one decision on that point: thus we must look to additional
factors to find out why the judge decided as he did. 2 9
It is important to note that legal realists in general do not believe that
nothing determines the outcomes of judicial decisions, so that the result can
never be predicted.30 Thus, the fact that we know with certainty that a
jaywalker will not be capitally punished does not undermine the realists' thesis.
The realists' point is rather that the legal rules and facts of a case together do
not by themselves generate an outcome. An additional component, such as the
judge's ideology, plays a crucial role. (For example, no judge would ever be
willing to execute someone for jaywalking, for moral, political, or social
reasons.)3 Realists might concede that there are "easy" cases (in an epistemic
sense) or predictable results that provide strong incentives for parties to settle,
but they believe that the reason these results are predictable has to do with the
politics or ideology of judges, or with judges' intuitions about the fairness of
the situation. They are not predictable because of the determinate effects of
legal rules themselves.32 Thus, the realists deny that the sources of law, in the
positivist sense,33 play a significant role in determining the outcomes of cases.
LANGUAGE (1984); and Quassim Cassam, Necessity and Externality. 95 MIND 446 (1986).
28. See Leiter, supra note 27, at 261. Other realists provide different accounts of what motivates
judicial decisionmaking. For example, Singer emphasizes the structure of legal arguments. legal culture.
and capitalist ideology. See Singer, supra note 4, at 21-23.
29. Leiter, supra note 27, at 267.
30. See Singer, supra note 4, at 20-21. This is important because it shows that legal realists cannot
really be attacking the determinacy of judicial decisions (i.e., their predictability).
31. Tushnet argues, for example, that judges could rule that the Constitution requires socialism, but
that they do not because of their socialization. See Tushnet. supra note 4. at 823.
32. The force of "rules themselves" must be explained. If nearly all legal realists concede that judicial
decisions are not wholly random, then they believe that there are causal explanations for judicial decisions.
The crucial realist point, however, is that legal rules do not occupy an important place in such causal
explanations. This distinction is important for those who view the existence of "easy" cases as a problem
for legal realists.
If there are certain instances where all judges, lawyers, and legal scholars can predict the outcome
of a case before it is decided, doesn't that prove that the law is determinate? Yes, in the limited sense that
it proves that something determines such cases, but this does not prove that legal rules are playing the
crucial role. For example, someone might look at a very conservative court and predict how it will decide
a gay rights case without knowing anything about the state of equal protection or privacy law. In such a
case, there may not be legal determinacy, even though there is predictability (which produces an "easy"
case). The important sense in which predictability can exist without legal determinacy provides one reason
for not explaining realism by reference to belief in "easy" cases, which is essentially an epistemic notion.
See infra Par IV.
33. While I do not attempt to provide a strict definition of the sources of law in the positivist sense,
the positivist's sources of law are, in general, statutes, regulations, case law. and other material sources.
as opposed to social norms, moral principles, and other more idealized sources. See. e.g.. HART. supra note
3, passim. Realists do not necessarily deny that these other sources play a significant role in determining
the outcomes of cases. In fact, ideology may be just such a source.
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Here it is useful to recall the two reasons for why someone might be
interested in legal rule following. 4 If one is interested in an account of how
life under law is possible, predictability is enough to provide an explanation
for how people can know in advance what behavior will and will not be
proscribed by the law, as a practical matter. This does not require that rules
play the key causal role in producing judicial outcomes, merely that these
outcomes are predictable. Thus, if all one wants are outcomes that are "easy"
(i.e., predictable), the realist critique will not be troublesome.35
However, if one is interested in legitimacy, then the determinacy of legal
rules will be important. To understand this, it is worth briefly reviewing some
plausible theories of judicial legitimacy. In general, most theories that explain
legitimate government fall under three rubrics. First, there are actual consent
theories, whereby government is legitimate because people consent to it, either
explicitly36 or tacitly.37 Second, there are theories based on the idea that
people would consent to the government under some kind of idealized
circumstances, such as if people were perfectly rational.38 Finally, there are
theories that fit broadly into the natural law category.39 These theories argue
that government should be organized based on principles inherent in the
structure of government, human nature, or the world. Thus, all three kinds of
theory rely on rules, arising from a source external to any particular
government, to make that government legitimate.
On any one of these theories, a legitimate government would be one based
on principles derived from either the people's actual consent, idealized consent,
or the structure of natural law. For judicial review to be justified under one of
these theories, judges must be able to act according to those principles. Take,
for example, a very weak consent theory. According to this theory, in a
democratic society based on consent, a judge's decision against one party in
a court of law is justifiably enforceable only if the party who loses has, at the
very least, some good reason to believe that, at least in theory, he or she had
a chance to express an opinion40 about some of the factors that were crucial
in deciding the outcome of the case. For example, if the decision is entirely (or
almost entirely) the result of the judge's particular political or personal
34. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
35. For theorists interested in the predictability benefits of the rule of law, see O.W. Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897); and Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1989).
36. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16, 106-11 (1975).
37. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 65 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Pub'g Co. 1980) (1690).
38. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (1971).
39. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
40. "Express an opinion" here is perhaps somewhat ambiguous. In a more philosophically technical
sense, I mean that people should believe that the political institutions gave them a chance to play a
substantial role in determining the content of whatever criteria were used to decide their case-in other
words, that they had a chance to play some causal role in the decision process.
1860 [Vol. 107: 1853
Wittgenstein and Legal Realism
preferences and the parties had no role in shaping those preferences, then the
decision is not legitimate.
A rule-based conception of judicial decisionmaking comports well with
this simple democratic picture. Rules are (for the most part) the products of
legislatures, chosen by people when they vote, 4' and the loser of a suit should
be satisfied by knowing that he or she played a role in choosing the rule that
was dispositive in his or her case.42 However, if the legal rules had very little
to do with the outcome of the decision, the losers may well wonder in what
sense their fate comports with democratic principles.
Put another way, if a judge's ideology or acculturation plays a decisive
role in determining any given judicial outcome, the law will not appear
legitimate to someone who does not share that ideology or acculturation and
played no part in producing it. A litigant's chance to change (through voting)
the rules "applied" by a judge will be of little use if the judge's ideology
determines the litigant's fate. Other theories of legitimacy face a similar
dilemma.43 Thus, the realists argue that if ideology or some other force plays
the central role in determining how cases are decided, the rule of law cannot
be justified. Singer puts the problem quite strongly:
Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is
not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make
highly controversial political choices, but use the ideology of legal
reasoning to make our institutions appear natural and our rules appear
neutral ....
... [If legal reasoning is indeed indeterminate, then] the question
is whether it is possible to set up a legal system based on the rule of
law. If legal reasoning is ... indeterminate, there are no objective
limits on what judges or other governmental officials can do. Thus the
goal of constraining government or regulating interpersonal conduct
by previously knowable general rules seems impossible."
41. The common law situation is slightly more complicated. There, it is the citizen's ability to create
the rule by voting for statutory change that explains the decision's legitimacy.
42. Obviously, this account is too brief to explain many interesting aspects of the role of judicial
processes in democracy. Given this formulation, for example, a simple but adequate theory of legitimacy
would be to have elected judges who did not decide based on rules. Many states elect rather than appoint
their judges. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law.
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 689 (1995) (noting that most judgeships are actually elected rather than appointed).
Such a solution would have its own problems, however. Elected judges could assuage people's concerns
about not having chosen their judges, but such judges could not substitute for the consistcncy that decisions
according to legal principles can provide. Consistency (which can be explained in terms of equality) is
another element of democratic fairness that cannot easily be captured without rulc-based decisionmaking.
Aside from this, a large body of literature criticizes the practice of electing judges. See. e.g., id.
43. If the rules are products of some kind of idealized deliberation, then judicial decisionmaking can
only be legitimate if judges act according to rules generated by that deliberation; if the rules are dictated
by natural law, then judges must base their decisions on those rules.
44. Singer, supra note 4, at 5-7. Singer concludes that legal practice can be justified without recourse
to this kind of determinacy, see id. at 62-63, but his vision of the basis for legal practice is radically
different from those endorsed by most theorists seeking to answer the realists.
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In this sense, most realists (whether or not they recognize it) attack the
basis for the legitimacy of the legal system, not the predictability of legal rules
themselves. The challenge for those answering the realists, therefore, is to
show one of two things: either that legal rules do determine the outcomes of
judicial decisions, or that some other force, which can provide the basis for a
legitimate legal system, determines the outcomes of those decisions. 45 I aim
to show that Wittgenstein's critique of rule following makes it unlikely that
legal rules are determinative, and further that it is unlikely that any "other
force" satisfies legitimacy requirements. It is in this sense that my project is
sympathetic to the legal realists.
II. KRIPKE AND THE WITTGENSTEINIAN LEGAL REALISTS
While belief in the indeterminacy of rules is central to the realist project
generally, my interest for the purposes of this Note centers specifically on
those realists who rely on Wittgenstein to ground their belief in the
indeterminacy of legal rules. James Boyle, Mark Tushnet, and Charles Yablon
all utilize a particular account of Wittgenstein's argument in Philosophical
Investigations-that of Saul Kripke-to cast doubt on the possibility of rule
following in law.46 Their claim is that Wittgenstein shows that no rule for
interpreting a word can ever tell someone how to use it correctly in a given
case. These theorists contend that there is no fact one can point to that
determines what counts as a correct usage: Nothing fixes the meaning of a
45. At least two other alternative theories of legitimacy could survive the realist critique. First, any
theory that allows people to consent to being governed by a group of people, rather than a set of principles,
would qualify. With such a theory there would be no need for a connection between rules and outcomes
to produce legitimacy. Some might argue that a broadly Aristotelian theory (where people of good character
decide what is best) would fit this picture. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, T!HE POLrnIcs at bk. 1, ch. 5 (Cames Lord
trans., University of Chicago 1984) (arguing, on one reading, that some individuals are by nature marked
for subjection, others for rule). Second, a theory that specified an ideology, politics, or way of behaving
that was legitimate, rather than a set of principles, could satisfy the requirement. For example, if judges
were to decide based on certain institutional customs, and those customs were legitimate simply by virtue
of their being the customs of that institution, that would produce legitimacy even given the validity of the
realist critique. Needless to say, I do not find strategies of these types persuasive. As Learned Hand once
said, "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew
how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living
in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs." LEARNED
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1958).
46. All three of these theorists appear to be relying on a Kripkean reading. Yablon explicitly cites
Kripke. See Yablon, supra note 2, at 614 (citing KRIPKE, supra note 2). The others seem to take their
interpretations of Wittgenstein as uncontroversial. In contrast, anti-realists such as Langille and Smith treat
Kripke as a somewhat eccentric interpreter of Wittgenstein. See, e.g., Langille, supra note 2, at 491; Smith,
supra note 16, at 176 n.63. In fact, the truth lies somewhere in between. Kripke's view is undoubtedly
considered controversial in some ways; many other prominent theorists, however, have articulated views
that could similarly be applied in defense of legal realist forms of indeterminacy. See, e.g., Norman
Malcolm, Wittgenstein on Language and Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHY 5 (1989) (arguing that Wittgenstein's model
of rule following does not apply where agreement by a community is lacking); Crispin Wright, Critical
Notice, 48 MIND 289 (1989) (reviewing COLIN MCGINN, WrrrGENSTEIN ON MEANING (1984)) (criticizing
McGinn's interpretation of Wittgenstein).
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word.4 7 As a result, all language use exhibits a baseline indeterminacy. This
baseline indeterminacy then spills over into all rules built upon language.
Language is indeterminate; legal rules are built on (or with) language; therefore
legal rules are indeterminate.48 If legal rules are indeterminate, they cannot
compel judges toward any particular outcome in a given case.
It is worth rehearsing the argument Kripke makes in some detail, 49 both
to get a sense of its intuitive persuasiveness and because inaccuracies in
understanding how it is set up create confusion when alternative theories are
considered.50 Kripke asks us to consider what we think it means to
understand the mathematical rule of addition. The basic idea is that if someone
were to ask us to add two numbers, we would know the correct response even
if we had never considered adding those two numbers before:
One point is crucial to my "grasp" of this rule. Although I myself
have computed only finitely many sums in the past, the rule
determines my answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have
never previously considered. This is the whole point of the notion that
in learning to add I grasp a rule: my past intentions regarding addition
determine a unique answer for indefinitely many new cases in the
future.5
Kripke then asks us to imagine a computation we are asked to do, 68 plus 57,
and the answer we would give, obviously 125.52 Kripke emphasizes that we
would not give this answer just in cases where we had already considered this
particular sum. In fact, it is central to Kripke's example that we have never
previously considered this problem (or, in particular, any addition problem that
involved a number as large as 57), because the whole point of addition's being
a rule is that we are able to generate the answer in cases that we have not
considered previously.
But imagine a "bizarre" skeptic, who thinks that the answer we must give
to 68 plus 57 is 5. 5' This skeptic believes that we violate the rules for the
47. Throughout this Note, I treat correctness and determinacy as ,nextncably linked. A theory of how
to follow a rule correctly would produce a determinate rule. and a state of legal indeterminacy is one in
which there is no unique application of a rule that is correct to the exclusion of others.
48. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 707-11 & n.75; Tushnet. supra note 4. at 822-23 & n.130; Yablon.
supra note 2, at 628-33. Of course, it is also possible that legal rules might be indeterminate even though
linguistic rules are determinate.
49. Kripke attributes his argument to Wittgenstcin, though he is admittedly less than certain about this
attribution: "I choose to be so bold as to say: Wittgenstcin holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as
to whether I mean plus or quus." KRIPKE, supra note 2. at 70-7 1.
50. For example, I believe that Bix misses a crucial aspect of Wittgenstem's relevance for legal theory
in part because he misconceives the problem presented in the rule-following arguments. See infra Section
'V.B.
51. KRIPKE, supra note 2, at 7-8.
52. See id. at 8.
53. See id. Kripke does not expect us to find the possibility of such a skeptic believable. The skeptic
simply constitutes a dramatic device to present a philosophical problem. He believes this problem has a
solution, and that the use of the example helps to clarify the philosophical issues involved. See id. at 1 1-19.
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addition function if we give the answer as 125. In fact, says the skeptic, the
rule for addition is that for two numbers less than 57 the answer according to
the addition function is their sum; for addition involving any numbers equal
to or greater than 57, however, the answer given by the addition function is
5.54 Kripke refers to this as "quaddition." 55 It is important to remember that
Kripke's skeptic does not say merely that he understood addition differently,
or even just that all previous examples we have considered underdetermine
whether addition or quaddition is involved.56 Rather, the skeptic claims that
we have changed the rules of addition, so that the present usage is inconsistent
with the rule we used before. "The sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am
now misinterpreting my own previous usage.' '57 To answer the skeptic, then,
I must point to some fact about either myself or the world (either in previous
computations I have done or in any thoughts I have had) that can prove that
my previous uses of addition were consistent with the answer to this problem
being 125 rather than 5. Such a fact would then provide the basis for the
meaning of addition and would also provide a justification for why I gave the
answer I did.
Unfortunately, there is no such fact. Everything in my past mental history
and use of the addition rule is consistent with both quaddition and addition:
Ordinarily, I suppose that, in computing "68+57" as I do, I do not
simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I
previously gave myself that uniquely determine that in this new
instance I should say "125". What are these directions? By hypothesis,
I never explicitly told myself that I should say "125" in this very
instance. Nor can I say that I should simply "do the same thing I
always did" if this means "compute according to the rule exhibited by
my previous examples." That rule could just as well have been the
rule for quaddition (the quus function) as for addition.58
Kripke considers several alternative responses that I do not discuss in
detail here. For the most part, the skeptical strategy can be repeated
54. Kripke calls the skeptic's function "quus," and defines it as:
x * y = x + y, if x, y < 57
= 5 otherwise.
Similarly, "quaddition" for the skeptic corresponds to our addition. The skeptic thought that when we first
spoke of "plus," we meant quus. See id. at 8-9.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Both of these claims follow from the skeptic's argument. However, to reduce Kripke's point to
this would make the argument an essentially epistemological one (e.g., "How do we know we mean
addition?"). Kripke's point is that this dilemma is also metaphysical: There is no fact that determines that
our past usage was addition rather than quaddition. See id. at 21. Wright criticizes McGinn for missing this
point. See Wright, supra note 46, at 289. Later, I criticize Bix for the same reason. See infra note 113 and
accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 117.
57. KRIPKE, supra note 2, at 9.
58. Id. at 10-11.
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successfully against all of them."9 If we attempt to explain our prior
understanding in terms of counting, the skeptic replies with a bizarre
interpretation of counting ("quounting"); if by appeal to independence,
"quindependence"; and so on, ad nauseum. Whenever we attempt to provide
another rule for interpreting addition, the same indeterminacy about the
meaning of addition is transferred to this new rule.6°
Kripke's point can be understood in the following way. We might think
of correctness in addition (or in any rule following) as a process of matching
a given person's responses with idealized correct ones. There is some ideal
answer to the problem 68 plus 57, and a given speaker is correct when his or
her response matches the ideal one. Kripke argues that, given our
understanding of what it is to grasp a rule, nothing (that is, no previous
computation, fact about my mental history, etc.) could fill the role of this ideal
response. There is no fact that would make 125 the unique right answer to the
problem prior to the problem being posed. The answer cannot be stipulated
because the point of following a rule is that the rule actually generates
answers. But nothing we have ever thought about the rule, and no previous
action that we have taken in accordance with it, is inconsistent with the answer
to the problem being 5 rather than 125. So the rule as understood prior to this
case does not have the resources within it to determine a single correct new
response.
Though Kripke's prime example is from mathematics, his underlying point
is about the meaning of rules and is therefore easily generalizable, at least
initially, to language and all forms of rule-guided behavior.6' Thus, someone
might in winter begin to ask people to turn on the "blight" and react in
confusion when we ask them to turn on the light, because they believe the
word "light" only refers to light in the summer. Or, to take an example from
59. Actually, there is one response Kripke discusses that does not fail because of the skeptical strategy.
We might try to give an account of the fact about what we meant in terms of our disposition to give a
particular response to particular addition problems. We are disposed to answer 125 even before we do, and
that is why 125 is the correct answer. Kripke considers this answer in detail. See id. at 22-34. Its essential
flaw is not that the skeptic can doubt our dispositions, but rather that the disposition does not explain why
we are justified in giving one answer rather than another. The existence of our disposition only points to
the fact that we usually do, in fact, give one answer rather than another, not that we are correct in doing
so. Kripke's treatment of the dispositional account is particularly interesting in light of the attempts by
Owen Fiss, Dennis Patterson, and others to provide a Wittgensteinian account of legal rule following using
the notion of interpretive communities. See, e.g., Owen Fiss. Conventionalism. 58 S. CAL L REv. 177
(1985); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, in WrrrGENsTEIN AND
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 85. Just as the dispositional account cannot explain why we arc justified
in giving the response we are disposed to give, recourse to an interpretive community cannot explain why
that community, especially when it is fairly small, can legitimate the decisions of judges who are not bound
by rules. See infra Part V. Justification in Kripke plays a role analogous to legitimacy in legal theory.
60. See KRiPKE, supra note 2, at 15-17. Kripke's word choice here was clearly not ideal.
61. As Kripke writes, "Of course, these problems apply throughout language and arc not confined to
mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought
out." Id. at 19.
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Wittgenstein, we could imagine someone who does not apply the color words
as we do in particular cases.62
The realists using Wittgenstein make their appearance at this stage.
Following the skeptical arguments described above, they claim that language
must exhibit a certain baseline indeterminacy grounded in the absence of facts
that tell us how to proceed in particular cases.63 If language exhibits this
baseline indeterminacy, and legal rules are built on language (and share all of
its instability), legal propositions can have no determinative force either.
Therefore, the realists conclude, judges are never compelled by rules. As Boyle
argues:
On the most basic level [the post-Wittgensteinian] view of language
seems to undermine the picture of the neutral interpretive function of
the judiciary....
... The formalists had tried to get around the problem that
[ethical subjectivism] posed for the legitimacy of the judicial role by
covertly relying on another kind of essence-the essential meaning of
words.... Yet the more closely one looked at law or at language, the
more the formalistic idea of interpreting the core meanings of words
seemed to fall apart. The realists imagined that we could easily desert
a narrow formalism once we realized that there was no real meaning
of a word.64
Thus, the legal realists use Kripke's version of Wittgenstein's argument to
establish their belief in the indeterminacy of legal rules.65 Judges are not
compelled by legal rules because rules never determine any particular result in
a given case. Though judges may justify their decisions by reference to rules,
any result can be made to accord or not accord with the rule. Therefore, judges
really decide based on their politics, ideologies, class preferences, or something
else. 66 Judges give the rules whatever content they wish after they have
62. See WITIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note I, § 1.
63. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 708 & n.28; Singer, supra note 4, at 19; Tushnet, supra note 4, at 822-
23; Yablon, supra note 2, at 628.
64. Boyle, supra note 4, at 710-11. Yablon makes a similar argument. See Yablon, supra note 2, at
632. Like Boyle, he does not conclude that legal rules are random, but only that legal rules by themselves
underdetermine the outcome of judicial decisions, even if we construe them according to their original
intent. See id. at 633.
65. Of course, the realists would not have to be committed to the view that the indeterminacy of legal
rules is contingent upon the indeterminacy of language. The rule-following critique could be applied to
legal rules even if linguistic rules exhibited determinacy for some other reason. This is the strategy for
which I argue later. See infra Part V. I do not claim that the legal realists discussed here would not make
this argument. I have presented their arguments as attacks on linguistic determinacy both because that is
how they are taken by the anti-realists and because taking these arguments that way provides a helpful
entry into the constructive uses of Wittgenstein.
66. Yablon refers to the "social, cooperative, and even political process implicated in discussions about
rules." Yablon, supra note 2, at 633. One may well wonder here how it is that these social processes could
determine decisions given Wittgenstein's rule-following arguments. Why are social processes more
determinate than legal rules? The answer to this objection requires a foray into Wittgenstein's theory of
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decided, for other reasons, how they want the case to come out.
Further, the realists argue that indeterminacy is not prevalent in just a few
extreme cases (which a positivist might explain through discretion 67 ), but in
all cases.68 Given the source of their argument in Kripke's skepticism about
rules in general, this is not surprising. If Kripke's argument applies to even the
easiest of rules (like addition), the legal realists claim, it surely applies to even
the clearest legal rule in the most obvious of cases.
Here, a well-known example from Ronald Dworkin's work is helpful. In
Taking Rights Seriously, 69 Dworkin refers to Riggs v. Palmer," a case in
which a man who murdered his grandfather sought to inherit under the
grandfather's will from his estate. The law regarding wills seemed to indicate
clearly that the grandson was the legitimate heir. As the court stated, "[I]t is
quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the
devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can
in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this
property to the murderer.",71 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the basic
principle that no one shall profit from his own wrongdoing justified ruling
against the murderer in this case.72 While Dworkin uses this case to illustrate
a distinction between rules and principles," legal realists might well point to
the case on the grounds that it shows how even the most straightforward
application of a rule to a new case can be altered. Because the previous cases
can be cited in defense of multiple principles, their relevance to a new case
can always be construed in conflicting ways:
There are always a number of justificatory principles available to
make sense of case I and a number of techniques to select the "true"
basis of case I. Of course, the opinion in case I will articulate a
principle that purports to support the result. But the thrust of
introductory law courses is to show that the principles offered in
opinions are never good enough. And this indefiniteness
bedevils-and liberates-not only the commentators and the lawyers
interpretation, which I discuss in detail in Part V. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text. Bricfly.
legal rules always require interpretation prior to their application, which creates the indeterminacy descnbed
in Wittgenstein's critique. Social and ideological beliefs, however, are driven by a form of understanding
more basic than interpretation, and on which interpretation itself depends.
67. See HAT, supra note 3, at 124-36, for a discussion of discretion, which Hart descnbes as the
"open texture" in the law, id. at 124. A positivist following Hart would hold that in some cases legal rules
underdetermine the appropriate outcome, and in these cases judges have discretion. However. in other cases
the legal rules fix the outcome and there is no discretion. See id. It might not be inconsistent with the
central tenets of positivism for a positivist to hold that discretion exists in all eases, but such a positivist
would be hard pressed to provide an account of why the rule of law by judges is legitimate. Of course,
some positivists may not be interested in such an account.
68. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 4, at 813.
69. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RiGmS SERIousLY 23 (1977).
70. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
71. Id. at 189.
72. See id. at 190.
73. See DWORKIN, supra note 69, at 23.
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and judges subsequently dealing with the decision; it equally affects
the author of the opinion.74
Although the court in Riggs referred to a basic principle to justify its departure
from the rule, the legal realist would argue that such basic principles could be
cited to produce any outcome in any case. Indeterminacy exists even in
apparently straightforward decisions.75
Im. THE ANTI-REALISTS AND A DIFFERENT WITTGENSTEIN
Not all legal scholars interested in Wittgenstein see things as the
Wittgensteinian realists do. I focus on three scholars (whom I call the anti-
realists) who have a radically different view of Wittgenstein's place in this
debate. Langille, 76  Smith,77  and Marmor 78  all say that the realist
understanding of Wittgenstein's argument in Philosophical Investigations is
entirely misguided. While Wittgenstein did show that a rule-based
understanding of language was flawed, the anti-realists argue, he did not
believe in the indeterminacy or instability of meaning in general; in fact, that
such instability did not exist was a premise of Wittgenstein's argument.
79
Furthermore, the anti-realists contend, Wittgenstein's conclusion was only that
a rule-based view of language was flawed, not that all language was
indeterminate.80 In short, Wittgenstein did not defend the sort of skepticism
about meaning that the legal realists attribute to him. Instead, the anti-realists
argue that Wittgenstein's alternative account of meaning (in language and
mathematics) actually provides a basis for understanding how legal discourse
can be determinate, even in the face of the skeptical uncertainty that he
describes as arising on a purely rule-based view.8
The anti-realists' argument can be reconstructed in the following way:82
Wittgenstein saw himself engaged in a project of elucidating our practices, not
74. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 811.
75. Lest anyone think that the grandson's action was so egregious that no one could possibly allow
him to inherit from his victim, I should note that one of the three judges dissented. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at
191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
76. See Langille, supra note 2, at 493.
77. See Smith, supra note 16, at 179.
78. Marmor does not specifically target the Wittgensteinian realists I described supra Part I1. However,
his exposition of Wittgenstein and his use of Wittgenstein in defense of Hart are clearly inconsistent with
the views of the Wittgensteinian realists. See Marmor, supra note 17, at 201-07.
79. See, e.g., Marmor, supra note 17, at 196-97; Smith, supra note 16, at 163-64.
80. See, e.g., Langille, supra note 2, at 491; Smith, supra note 16, at 168.
81. See Langille, supra note 2, at 497; Marmor, supra note 17, at 207. Smith does not necessarily
believe that Wittgenstein can be used to ground legal determinacy, though she agrees that he cannot be
used in defense of skepticism about the determinacy of legal rules. See Smith, supra note 16, at 188.
82. Because Wittgenstein wrote in an aphoristic style, touching on subjects and then returning to them
again and again, it is very difficult to present his arguments in chronological form. Thus, I have attempted
to order them, both here and infra Part V. The structure is imposed by me and should not be attributed to
Wittgenstein. I take the risk that this may distort his argument or violate the spirit of his enterprise.
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reforming them. He did not think philosophers should attempt to correct
normal everyday practices.83 Instead, he took the perfectly satisfactory
functioning of language and the communication of meaning as a given.
Similarly, he accepted that people learn basic mathematical skills (like
addition) without difficulty and use those skills without substantial
disagreement.8 Thus, Wittgenstein's target in the passages on rule following
was not meaning itself, but rather a particular rule-based picture of meaning:
"It is this account of grasping a concept and not, of course, our obvious ability
in some sense to 'grasp a concept' which Wittgenstein meant to challenge.""
The anti-realists agree that the rule-based picture is problematic in roughly
the way Kripke described. The rule cannot by itself determine correct
applications (because there is no fact of the matter that makes the rule
inconsistent with one application and consistent with another). Attempts to
clear up this indeterminacy through the use of other rules only lead to an
infinite regress of rules. Thus, the rule-based picture cannot explain how
meaning is possible. However, this does not prove that meaning is impossible;
it only shows that we must reject the rule-based picture.6 In its place,
Wittgenstein offers an alternative picture, which the realists ignoreY The
justification for calling one application of a rule correct resides in the practice
or technique of the activity of which the rule is a part. That activity makes up
our form of life, and this provides all the justification we need.U As Langille
writes:
83. See WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note I. § 124 ("Philosophy may in
no way interfere with the actual use of language .... It leaves everything as it is.")
84. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 16, at 172.
85. Id. at 166.
86. Though it is of limited relevance for this discussion, it should be noted that every legal scholar
that I have encountered has misunderstood Kripke's conclusion. All of them read Kripke as endorsing
skepticism. See, e.g., Langille, supra note 2 at 465 n.58; Smith, supra note 16, at 179. While Kripke does
think that Wittgenstein's arguments show more than just that we should reject a rule-based view of
language, he does not endorse the view that there is no correct way to follow a rule (that is. global
skepticism). He explicitly rejects the view that skepticism is justified and that truth is determined by
community consensus. Instead, he says that what we are warranted in asserting is determined by community
consensus, while remaining agnostic about the truth of these matters. See KRIPKE. supra note 2. at I I 1-12.
87. This accusation is grounded in Kripke's emphasis on the first paragraph of § 201 of Philosophical
Investigations (which poses the skeptical dilemma) while ignoring the second paragraph (which resolves
it). See Smith, supra note 16, at 163-64. 1 include Wittgenstein's passage in full:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can
be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so
there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course
of our argument we give one interpretation after another, as if each one contented us at least
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there
is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we
call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.
WrTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note 1. § 201.
88. I remain agnostic about the plausibility of this view in the context of language and mathematics.
My argument is that this model of justification does not apply to law. whether or not it works in language
and mathematics.
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The strong sceptic misses the central message of the Investigations,
a message which is not destructive of but important for law. More
than anything it is the idea of language as an activity (not a mental
process) which resonates throughout the Philosophical
Investigations....
.. . [I]n Wittgenstein's world, indeterminacy is not the result
because our language has the "determinacy of an activity". Nor is the
lesson of the rule-following critique scepticism, but rather, insight into
the idea of practice as "bedrock". 89
On this account of Wittgenstein, it is the community's agreement in
judgments that makes our practices stable. Judgments about the right and
wrong ways to follow rules are immune from skeptical doubt because there is
a settled practice that determines what counts as following a rule correctly.
Though we do not appeal to this practice to verify judgments, it is because of
this background existence of agreement that settled judgments are possible:'
"[A]greement in judgments is a necessary precondition of language, the
background 'given' which makes language possible .... 9
Unfortunately, this treatment of Wittgenstein's alternative model is hardly
more than a sketch. To defend their project thoroughly, one might reasonably
expect Langille, Smith, and Marmor to offer an explanation of how the
Wittgensteinian alternative is to operate in the context of law. However, none
of the leading critics of the realists does this in any detail.' Langille comes
the closest, in that he recognizes that further work must be done to apply
Wittgenstein to law.93 He claims that scholars have begun to see the
Wittgensteinian idea of grounding justification in practice "as central to an
understanding of law., 94 He then references Hart's idea of judges using social
rules that must be understood from an internal point of view, and similar
theories of community in Fiss and Dworkin.95 Langille's treatment neglects
89. Langille, supra note 2, at 488 (paraphrasing Gerald Graff, 'Keep offthe Grass,' 'Drop Dead,' and
Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TFx. L. REv. 405. 408 (1982)). Marmor
reaches a similar conclusion: "Tihere is a normative connection between rules and actions, which consists
in the fact that there is a custom of using the sign or rule thus and so, and not otherwise. Which is to say
that learning how to follow a rule is learning to master a technique." Marmor, supra note 17, at 204.
90. It is important to note here that Wittgenstein is not arguing that we rely on background consensus
to settle disputes about language use. Rather, the argument is that, in a field (language game) where there
is background agreement, these kinds of correctness judgments are possible.
91. Langille, supra note 2, at 493.
92. Of course, there are other critics who attempt to construct alternative conceptions of legal
determinacy that are Wittgensteinian in spirit. See infra Part V.
93. Actually, Bix, who does not defend an alternative view of legal determinacy, quite clearly
recognizes the problems of applying Wittgenstein to legal theory. See Bix, supra note 18, at 216. However,
he conceives of the problem as the difference between "easy" cases (as in mathematics) and "hard" cases
(as in law), and therefore does not see the potential for a Wittgensteinian method of analyzing correctness
in the law. See id. at 252. I discuss Bix in detail below. See infra Sections IV.A-B.
94. Langille, supra note 2, at 497.
95. See id. at 498-99 (citing works including HART, supra note 3; Fiss, supra note 13; and Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1982)).
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the possibility that Wittgenstein himself may have acknowledged limitations
to his theory of justification based on practice. He clearly underestimates the
difficulty involved in explicating a theory of legal rule following based on
Wittgenstein's alternative account.
Smith does not actually attempt to explain how her schematic descriptions
of justification through practice or activity or technique could be applied to
law:
[T]he issue of whether [interpretive legal theorists] can give an
account of adjudication upon which a theoretical justification for its
legitimacy can be based is an issue on which the jury is still out ....
... The arguments for profound scepticism and linguistic
indeterminacy are attempts to defeat all the theoretical justification for
legitimacy at one blow. . . . When this argument fails, as it does, the
important arguments about legitimacy remain to be made .... .'
While claiming that the legal realist arguments are not themselves enough to
establish that legal rule following is indeterminate, Smith offers no account of
how Wittgenstein's theory might be used in aid of this determinacy.
Marmor's treatment in this respect is the most egregious. He moves
directly from his comments on rule following in Wittgenstein to their
application in law without considering that there might be important
differences between Wittgenstein's theory as applied to language or
mathematics and his theory as applied to law.97 Thus, while the anti-realists
may present a compelling case against skepticism in Wittgenstein's areas of
interest (mathematics and language), their arguments do not further the project
of applying Wittgenstein to law.
IV. WrIGENSTEIN IN LANGUAGE VERSUS WITrGENSTEIN IN LAW
I do not believe the critics of the realists are entirely misguided. It is
certainly plausible to argue that Wittgenstein does not endorse outright
skepticism.98 However, their position is deeply problematic even if we do not
read Wittgenstein as a skeptic. Problems arise when we consider the difference
between applying Wittgenstein's methodology to language or mathematics and
applying it to law.
A careful analysis of how Wittgenstein's arguments can be applied to law
leads to results that, at least initially, favor the legal realists' conclusions.
Wittgenstein's arguments against a rule-based picture (which show that a rule-
based picture justifies skepticism) apply quite straightforwardly to law.
96. Smith, supra note 16, at 188.
97. See Marmor, supra note 17, at 207.
98. See, e.g., McGINN, supra note 46, at 25 (cnticizing Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstem as
endorsing skepticism).
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Consequently, the arguments for why a rule-based picture of language cannot
provide linguistic determinacy also give us good reasons to believe that a rule-
based picture of law cannot generate legal determinacy. As Kripke made
clear,99 the arguments for the indeterminacy of meaning guided by rules are
general. Just as there is no fact that can definitively settle what someone meant
by "plus" in a previous case, there is also no fact about what the rule that two
signatures make a valid will meant with respect to this new case (e.g., it may
have meant two signatures make a valid will except when the inheritor did
wrong to gain inheritance, or something more bizarre, such as the meaning
must be different once we enter the age of electronic signatures, so that now
a will needs three signatures).
However, the arguments Wittgenstein uses to establish his alternative to
a rule-based account of language, which justifies itself as a practice and does
not require interpretation, cannot easily be made to work in law.t°° A
consideration of the issues involved in assessing the phenomena will make this
clear.'"'
A. Disagreement
Some commentators have focused on the fact that Wittgenstein uses
examples of rule following where there is no disagreement about how to go
on in new cases."° In fact, his examples are all ones in which there would
be immediate agreement about which response was correct. 0 3 In these areas,
there is what we might call noncollusive agreement in judgments. Wittgenstein
writes, "Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the
question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows
over it, for example. This is part of the framework on which the working of
our language is based .... ,104
This characteristic of Wittgenstein's examples is important to
understanding how his account of correctness might be applied to law, though
I do not believe it is ultimately useful for distinguishing law from language
99. See supra Part H.
100. The weakest version of this claim is that the application of Wittgenstein's alternative conception
to law requires some argument. The strongest version is that Wittgenstein's picture simply has no relevance
for law. I believe my arguments probably establish something in between. The crucial point is that Marmor,
Smith, and Langille do not do the necessary work to prove that Wittgenstein's ideas can be applied, and
also that those who have attempted to do this have failed to provide a satisfactory account. See infra Part
V.
101. For a good account of the unique characteristics of Wittgenstein's examples, see Simon
Blackburn, Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism, in WrrcENSTEIN: To FOLLOW A RuLE 163, 170
(Stephen H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).
102. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 18, at 217-18; Blackburn, supra note 101, at 170.
103. See Bix, supra note 18, at 209.
104. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 1, § 240. There are many passages
in Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein stresses the need for background agreement in our
mathematical and linguistic practices. For examples, see id. §§ 234, 237-238, 241-242.
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and mathematics. Recall that on the anti-realists' account of Wittgenstein, it
is the community's agreement in judgments (rather than the logical power of
rules) that makes our practices stable and immune from skeptical doubtYt°
We can judge the skeptic as wrong because he or she is radically out of step
with our way of doing things. However, if there is substantial disagreement
within the community already, this type of correctness judgment is impossible.
Blackburn explains this problem:
For Wittgenstein is taken to teach us that ... [c]oming adrift, that is
going wrong in a new application of an old term, is not a matter of
jumping pre-existent Platonic rails determining which way one ought
to go, for there can be no such things. It is a matter of getting out of
step, of having an organism that whirls differently from the others.
Suppose this is true. If that is the kind of way to see judgments of
inconsistency ... then it follows that they cannot be made when...
there is no consensus to serve as a background upon which they are
based. 06
Thus, Wittgenstein's account of how we follow a rule cannot be applied to
contexts where there is substantial disagreement. If there is substantially more
disagreement in law than in mathematics or language, then the anti-realist
project of applying Wittgenstein's account to law is doomed to failure.
There is certainly intuitive appeal to the idea that there is more
disagreement in law than in language or mathematics. At least some
disagreement about how cases should be decided is quite common among legal
scholars and judges. Moreover, the legal system has been designed with a
recognition that disputes are inevitable (hence appellate review, preclusion law
designed to minimize inconsistent judgments, etc.). Thus, a certain level of
disagreement is recognized as an inevitable part of the legal framework.'Gt
Even where there is agreement, it is often collusive and therefore not
necessarily reflective of genuine agreement. If judges agree after they have
conferred, this does not prove that they have the sort of shared judgments that
we find in mathematics and (perhaps) language.
t°8
105. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
106. Blackburn, supra note 101, at 172.
107. This provides at least one reason for believing that the level of disagreement in the law as applied
to deciding cases is qualitatively greater than the level of disagreement existing in the everyday use of
language or mathematics. However, the existence of such a qualitative difference is not central to my
argument.
108. Whether or not the same sort of shared judgments can be found in the everyday use of ordinary
language is a more difficult issue that is beyond the scope of this Note. To the extent that language does
exhibit substantial indeterminacy in its everyday use, Wittgensteins account of how language generates
determinacy is problematic. Whether or not this is true, his account cannot be straightforwardly applied to
law.
Here, it is worth noting again exactly what fields are being compared. I am not committed to the view
that Wittgenstein's account of correctness through shared judgments in mathematics and language is
plausible. I am only committed to the weaker claim that. whether or not this account works in those fields.
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Brian Bix focuses on comparative levels of disagreement and the
difference between "easy" and "hard" cases in his insightful article on the
application of Wittgenstein to legal theory." 9 In fact, Bix's evaluation of the
realists using Wittgenstein is very similar to mine.110 He believes that the
conclusions realists draw from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations are
misguided because Wittgenstein's arguments are meant to apply to contexts
where it is "easy" to know what the right answer is, such as math."' Thus,
he reads Wittgenstein as having offered an explanation for how correctness
operates in "easy" contexts,2 but concludes that Wittgenstein himself has
few lessons for how to ground correctness in "hard" contexts.
The first thing to note about this account is that the easy-hard distinction
does not seem entirely plausible. Surely, most of us consider some
mathematical problems to be quite hard. Conversely, some cases in law are
quite easy, which is to say that we think nearly everyone with a legal
education could predict how a court would decide them. The initial problem
here is that easy and hard are epistemic notions-they have to do with how we
know what the right answer is-whereas the central problem for the realists is
metaphysical. They treat law and mathematics as though they are similar types
of phenomena, when in fact they are different, regardless of how we come to
know about them."1
3
Bix might reply that he did not mean that in mathematics there are no
problems that are difficult to solve. Instead, he might say, he meant that in the
vast majority of cases competent mathematicians would agree about the
answers to easy or difficult problems, or at least would agree about how to
determine whether the answers were correct, whereas in law even the most
noted theorists entertain sharp disagreements about many important issues.
it does not work in law. However, given that the appropriate comparison is between simple mathematical
and linguistic practices (which Wittgenstein uses) and court decisions (which the realists challenge), I
believe a good case could be made that there is more disagreement in the legal field.
109. See Bix, supra note 18.
110. For example, Bix says of Langille that "Langille makes the significant move [from the grammar
of language] to the 'grammar of law' without either arguing for the transition or even noting why argument
might be needed." Id. at 216.
111. See id. at 212 ("Wittgenstein's discussions on rule-following in Philosophical Investigations
focused on easy cases, like the mathematical series 'add 2."').
112. Presumably there is little disagreement over how to go on in "easy" cases, so that Bix takes
Wittgenstein's account to apply to cases where there is general agreement.
113. It is unsurprising that Bix treats the issue this way, as he endorses an essentially epistemic
understanding of Wittgenstein's argument in the rule-following considerations. See Bix, supra note 18, at
211 n. 13 ("Wittgenstein was actually concerned with 'the nature and epistemology of rule-following'-that
is, how we can know what a rule requires of us in a particular situation."). Kripke's view, to which I am
more sympathetic, endorses a metaphysical rather than merely epistemological understanding of
Wittgenstein's argument:
So formulated, the problem may appear to be epistemological-how can anyone know which
of these I meant? Given however, that everything in my mental history is compatible both with
the conclusion that I meant plus and with the conclusion that I meant quus, it is clear that the
sceptical challenge is not really an epistemological one.
KRIPKE, supra note 2, at 21.
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While this response would represent an advance, it would lead to the unfruitful
(though much pursued) strategy of attempting to discern exactly how much
disagreement there really is in law. Certainly if one compares disagreement
over the simple addition rule to disagreement over the nature of the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to privacy, law appears rife with disagreement. However,
if one compares interpretations of the speed limit with Fermat's last
theorem," 4 law does not seem particularly lacking in consensus.
While there may be ways to resolve this debate over levels of
disagreement," 5 focusing on it misses the crucial lesson for legal theory that
Wittgenstein offers. Wittgenstein's account of agreement in mathematics and
language cannot be applied to law, regardless of whether or not the level of
disagreement in each area is the same. To see this, we must examine
Wittgenstein's notion of correctness itself.
B. Correctness
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the concept of
correctness in a given field is governed by the characteristics of that field, not
by some overarching notion of correctness that can be applied across
disciplinary boundaries.' 6 Bix misses the relevance of this argument for
legal theory because he understands Wittgenstein's claim in primarily
epistemological terms." 7 It is not just, as he says, that "[t]he way we think
about easy cases-and about 'correct' and 'incorrect' in easy cases-differs
sharply from our thinking in hard cases""'  (though that is undoubtedly true);
rather, it is that the way we think about correctness in law must be different
from the way we think about correctness in mathematics and language, because
114. Fermat's last theorem may not be the best example to use. While uncertainty concerning the
status of Fermat's last theorem existed for a long period of time. it now appears to have been definitively
proved. See generally SIMON SINGH, FERMAT'S ENIGMA (1997).
115. As I stated at the outset, see supra text accompanying notes 23-25. the relevant comparison for
the purposes of my argument is between simple mathematical rules and legal cases. Recognition of this
difference may help to resolve the debate, though some might still argue that the levels of disagreement
between the two are the same. Another way to resolve the debate might be to think about the nature of
disagreement in both fields-when and how the set of criteria that could be relevant to making the decision
in a given case is fixed, as compared to when the criteria for deciding what counts as a solution to a
mathematical problem are indeterminate. For example, a case like Riggs %. Palmer. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y.
1889), shows that extremely malleable concepts such as justice and equity can come into play to alter what
appears to be the plain interpretation of a rule in a given case. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying
text. Thus, even the speeding rule could prove complicated. The same may not be true for many simple
mathematical rules, such as addition. On this account, the possible disagreement in law could run deeper
than it does in mathematics.
116. See WIrrENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INvEsTtGATIONS. supra note I. at 224. Although Part I of
Philosophical Investigations is ordered by section. Part II is ordered by pages only. Therefore, where
citations in this Note to Philosophical hIvestigations lack section symbols, they refer to Part 11.
117. Bix concludes that theorists reading Wittgenstein for insights into problems in law "find more
in Wittgenstein than is actually there." Bix. supra note 18. at 223. 1 believe, however, that Wittgenstein
has much to offer legal theory by way of methodological insight.
118. Id. at 218.
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law is used in unique ways and plays a unique role in our social organization.
Even if it were true, as Bix might want to argue, that all cases in law were
hard and all in math easy, so that the level of disagreement really was much
greater in law, this observation alone would not get at the real issue, which is
about how the idea of correctness in law works. 19
While my dispute with Bix may seem like a technical, even esoteric, point
about the difference between epistemology and metaphysics in Wittgenstein's
philosophy, it actually concerns a deep and important issue, one that goes to
the most fundamental insights of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his thoughts
on philosophical method. In his famous discussion of games early in
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states, "Don't think, but look!"'"2
This cryptic admonition occurs in the context of a larger discussion (about the
concept of a game) in which he argues that we must reconceptualize our notion
of what defines concepts by examining how we use them. We must look at the
way the concept is used in order to determine how we define it, rather than
bringing a pre-formed notion of what counts as a definition and then applying
it to the working concept itself.'
2'
Wittgenstein's idea here is not restricted to concepts and definitions, but
rather is part of the more general method of looking to the characteristics of
a particular field to determine the criteria that we should use for evaluating the
correctness of judgments in that field. Wittgenstein explains the same idea
when discussing a comparison between certainty in mathematics and
psychology:
I can be as certain of someone else's sensation as of any fact. But
this does not make the propositions "He is much depressed", "25 X
25 = 625", and "I am sixty years old" into similar instruments. The
explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind.-
This seems to point to a psychological difference. But the difference
is logical.
... The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.'22
Correctness in law will be different in kind from correctness in other fields
because law is its own "kind of language game," with its own societal
functions. Thus, an analysis of whether or not legal judgments can be
determinately correct or not must begin with an analysis of certain basic
features of legal activity, not a simple transposition onto law of the concept of
119. Similarly, even if the levels of disagreement in law and mathematics were the same, this would
not obviate the need for distinct analyses of correctness in both fields, because they are different in so many
other ways.
120. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note I, § 66.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 224. For my purposes, the notion of a "language game" can be understood to refer to a
different field, so that correctness judgments will be made based on criteria unique to that field.
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correctness that Wittgenstein developed for (certain areas of) mathematics or
language. As I have shown, that concept cannot provide the basis for
grounding legal determinacy. If we are to reply to the realists, we must attempt
to explain correctness in a way that takes account of the distinctive features of
the legal language game.'
21
C. Justification
Perhaps the central distinctive feature of the legal language game, at least
when compared with Wittgenstein's examples from simple mathematics and
everyday language use, concerns the need to provide justifications for why
legal decisions come out the way they do. Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses in
his discussion of language and mathematics that reasoned justification is not
required in those realms. For example, he states: "When someone whom I am
afraid of orders me to continue the series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty,
and the lack of reasons does not trouble me."' 124 Elsewhere he writes, "When
I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly."'25 Blackburn believes
this to be a central aspect of Wittgenstein's view: "The whole stress in
Wittgenstein is on the automatic and compelling nature of rule-following."'
' 26
Thus, Wittgenstein says there is a sort of behavior for which we do not need
the kinds of reasons the skeptic demands, because we can behave without
explanation. 27 Furthermore, when faced with a skeptic who does demand
reasons in such situations, we are unable to provide them. This point arises in
Wittgenstein's example about a student who is unable to continue the series
of even numbers. 21 We can try to teach the student again and again, but at
some point, justification runs out. At that moment, "I am inclined to say: 'This
is simply what I do.' "1 29 When faced with a skeptic like the one imagined
by Wittgenstein, we eventually have nothing to say, and nothing to point to,
123. Another implication of my approach, which takes seriously the idea that legal correctness is
importantly unique to law, is that it makes Bix's suggestion for analyzing legal correctness problematic.
Bix's attempt to gain insight by looking at other fields with similarly -hard- cases fails to provide a
blueprint for a Wittgensteinian investigation into the nature of correctness in law.
124. WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTtGATtONS. supra note I. § 212.
125. Id. § 219.
126. Blackburn, supra note 101, at 170.
127. Again, Wittgenstein's model of blind action may not provide an adequate account of higher-level
mathematical reasoning or complex linguistic interpretation. The implications of thts should be clear. Even
if Wittgenstein's model does not plausibly describe justification tn mathematics and language, this does not
aid those hoping to utilize Wittgenstein's model for law. Alternatively, his model may be appropriate to
simple mathematical and linguistic behavior, but not to more complex behavior. This interpretation of
Wittgenstein would be consistent with some of his statements about mathematics. See supra note 26.
Finally, some may hold that the nature of mathematical and linguistic reasoning is fundamentally different
in kind from the nature of legal reasoning because the nature of the reflection involved is different. apart
from issues of justification. I do not defend that claim here. though it appears initially that this argument
may be stronger for mathematics than for language.
128. See WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note t. § 185.
129. Id. § 217.
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that could justify our continuation of the mathematical series in a way that
would satisfy him. However, when dealing with uncontroversial processes like
the addition rule, we never have a need for such a justification. This way of
going on is part of our form of life, and that is enough to justify it for our
purposes. Thus, the anti-realists are right to note that Wittgenstein concludes
that this appeal to our practices is all the justification we need, for language
and mathematics. We act without reference to reasons, and when people ask
for justifications, it does not bother us that we cannot provide them.
In law, however, most legal theorists and judges would want to provide
more than this when asked to justify their account of what constitutes the
correct following of a legal rule. Unlike in Wittgenstein's examples, those
analyzing judicial decisions do typically demand explanations and reasons for
those decisions (whereas, on Wittgenstein's view, only misguided philosophers
scrutinize an addition problem to see how it could be decided otherwise). With
each judicial decision, the coercive authority of the state (in the form of the
order to enforce a judgment) is deployed in defense of a particular account of
how to follow a rule correctly. To claim that this authority is as arbitrary as
the form of life that "we" happen to have would undermine the legitimacy of
the legal system (at least at a theoretical level), especially when there is
enough disagreement to make one wonder who the "we" is that shares this
form of life. 30
Here, Wittgenstein's demand for a theory of correctness tailored to the
unique characteristics of law dovetails neatly with the realists' demand for an
account of legal interpretation that can explain how legal decisions are
legitimate. Recall that the desire for an account of law that could explain why
law was governed by rules rather than people was part of the original interest
in explicating legal rule following and one of the basic requirements for
answering the realist.13' The realist seeks a principled reason why people
who are unhappy with the outcome of a case should nonetheless accept it. One
such reason might be that they played some part in creating the rules that were
dispositive in the case's outcome (or at least could have played such a part if
their candidate had won). However, if the judge's form of life made the
unfortunate outcome inevitable, it is unclear what reason such unhappy people
have to believe that the outcome is just.
Thus it should be clear that a simple attempt to apply the Wittgensteinian
formula for determinacy in mathematics and language straightforwardly to the
legal context is doomed to failure. Correctness in law must be different from
correctness in mathematics or language because in law one must provide a
justification that explains why a particular outcome is correct and that goes
beyond merely stating that it is the way things are done.
130. This is the essence of the realists' critique of the legitimacy of the legal system.
131. See supra Part I.
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Before turning to the discussion of alternative theories, it is worth noting
where we stand, lest all of the above be viewed as a detour. Wittgenstein's
arguments against a rule-based understanding of meaning in language and
mathematics establish that there can be no fact about a rule that determines
how we are to apply it in a new case. This critique applies as well to law as
it does to mathematics. Cases like Riggs 32 show that even the most
straightforward of rules do not, by themselves, clearly determine the outcomes
judges should reach. Wittgenstein did not believe that this conclusion should
leave us doubting our own practices of language and mathematics. Instead, he
suggested an alternative model for explaining how these practices are
determinate. However, this alternative model cannot be used to ground
determinacy in law. Legal decisions are not the product of behavior without
reflective thought. They must be explained by reference to reasons. In the face
of the state's coercive power, people affected by legal decisions and others in
the legal community demand substantive justifications for why the state's
authority is being deployed against them (or against their wishes). They
demand reasons for why cases have come out one way rather than another.
These characteristics (and perhaps others) require a unique account of legal
rule following.
Thus, it should be clear that the debate about the use of Wittgenstein for
or against legal indeterminacy has been won, in a surprising way, by the
realists. The anti-realists are right that the initial realist claim, that Wittgenstein
showed that all language was indeterminate and therefore that legal language
is also indeterminate, rests on a mistaken view about Wittgenstein's theory of
linguistic determinacy. However, Wittgenstein can be used to argue for legal
indeterminacy if we believe in a rule-based model of legal decisionmaking. To
respond to this, opponents of the realists would have to provide a theory of
correctness that was based on the unique characteristics of the law. Much work
remains to be done before opponents of the realists can establish such a
constructive use of Wittgenstein.
V. A WITIGENSTEINIAN LEGAL THEORY FOR REALISTS?
We began with a challenge posed by the realists: to provide an account of
legal decisionmaking that could explain how decisions are legitimate.
Traditional rule-based accounts of legal decisionmaking provide a simple
explanation for why legal decisions are legitimate, 33 but an understanding
of Wittgenstein's account of rule following suggests that legal rules cannot
play the central role in determining how cases are decided. In the process of
132. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
133. See supra Part I. On any of the most common theories of legitimacy, traditional rule-based
accounts are sufficient to explain the legitimacy of the legal system.
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exploring Wittgenstein's critique, we have attained both a fuller understanding
of the scope of Wittgenstein's rule-following arguments, and also a sketch of
an alternative method for analyzing legal decisionmaking.
Although the task of constructing a theory of legal decisionmaking is too
large to be entertained in this Note, I hope the discussion of Wittgenstein
above reveals important constraints on any such theory." 4 First, a theory of
legal correctness must take into account the unique features of law. The
discussion in Part IV suggests several such features. At least a certain amount
of disagreement over legal judgments is widespread, and institutions for
dealing with it show that this disagreement is expected. On the other hand,
there are many cases that people generally agree should be decided the same
way. Many disputes are settled, presumably in part because the participants are
fairly certain about how the case will come out. Thus, at least initially, it
appears that in certain situations people are able to make predictions based on
legal rules. 35 Besides these, other features of law will also be important.
Unlike ethics, 136 legal judgment does not appear to arise out of natural
reactions all people have, at least initially. There is also a final arbiter of most
legal decisions (the Supreme Court). But we think it coherent to criticize the
final arbiter on occasion, whereas we do not criticize the final arbiter for
empirical judgments (the world). These are the kinds of characteristics that
134. One helpful way of hinting at the appropriate direction is to provide a useful model. Such a
model can be drawn from Paul Johnston's excellent book on wittgenstein's use for ethics. See PAUL
JOHNSTON, WI'rGENSTEIN AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1989). Johnston begins with the recognition that
ethics and empirical judgment involve fundamentally different kinds of judgment, such that we must not
expect the explanations for how empirical judgment functions to aid us in understanding the workings of
ethics. See id. at 141-43. Empirical judgment is for Johnston what language and mathematics are for our
purposes. Because there is a way of independently assessing the correctness of empirical judgments (by
reference to the world), theorists have attempted to build ethical theories by constructing something that
independently determines the correctness of ethical judgments. Johnston sees this as misguided. See id. at
142. Just as models from language and mathematics are incorrectly applied to law, so also the empirical
knowledge model is incorrectly applied to ethics. He then analyzes the differences between ethics and
empirical judgment and through this analysis arrives at an account of moral concepts. See id. at 144-45.
On this account, we determine the correct application of moral rules differently from how we determine
the correct application of empirical rules.
I describe Johnston's method because it is consonant with Wittgenstein's important insight, described
above, that the criteria for correctness in law, as in any other field, must be derived from examining the
characteristics of that field. See supra text accompanying note 116. Johnston's treatment of ethics provides
a useful methodological (not substantive) model for analyzing law.
Finally, I should note here that, although Bix also cites Johnston with approval, see Bix, supra note
18, at 222, our uses of Johnston are quite different, and even inconsistent. Bix believes that Johnston has
provided an explanation of a Wittgenstein-inspired way of treating certain kinds of "hard" cases, and that
this model can be useful in law. See id. at 223. I, however, would be hesitant to apply Johnston's treatment
of correctness in ethics to law, just as I am hesitant to apply a theory from mathematics to law. Ethics as
a field is importantly different from law in many ways, even though "hard" cases exist in both fields.
135. One of the aims of this Note is to show that this fact alone does not demonstrate that legal rules
are determinate. Instead, this phenomenon should be one of the resources we use in attempting to construct
a theory of legal determinacy.
136. Cf JOHNSTON, supra note 134, at 96 ("[In ethics], the language-game does not consist in rules
which we learn; rather, it extends and develops certain natural reactions.").
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must be taken into account when constructing a theory of legal
correctness. 1
37
Second, any theory of legal correctness must not rely on rules, legal or
otherwise, to explain how judges decide cases. This is the ultimate implication
of Wittgenstein's rule-following critique. If, instead of legal rules, one explains
legal decisionmaking in terms of some other kind of rules (such as statutory
purposes), the Wittgensteinian problem will repeat itself. What is needed,
therefore, is a view that explains how judges make the leap from rule to
behavior. To explain this, a brief description of Wittgenstein's views on
interpretation may be helpful. 38 One way of understanding the rule-following
critique is as a problem about the infinite regression of rules. When we cannot
understand a rule, someone may attempt to help by offering a different,
synonymous description of the rule (an interpretation, in Wittgenstein's narrow
sense). If this still does not help, another version may be offered. Eventually,
most people come to understand the rule. This ultimate understanding does not
involve just another set of words, but a set of words that we can comprehend
and on which we can base our behavior. If we can never reach this stage of
understanding, no amount of synonymous interpretations of the rule will help.
In this sense, all interpretation is parasitic upon a more basic way of
understanding, which allows us to leap from language to behavior. Of course,
this way of understanding does not rule out the need for interpretation in all
cases. It may be that we first need interpretation and then need this more basic
way of understanding in certain areas of life, especially those more complex
areas where reasons are demanded and reflection is involved.1
39
To provide an explanation of how judges actually decide, then, a
description of the rules that they use as interpretive guides will not suffice. An
explanation of how the gap between interpretation and understanding is filled
by judges will be needed. In Wittgenstein's account of rule following in
mathematics and language, this work is done by reference to our "form of
life," and the way in which we learn the rules of grammar from a young
age. t4 A similar account for legal decisionmaking is also needed.
137. The list of characteristics is not meant to be exhaustive. I just hope to point to the kinds of
characteristics that a theory sensitive to law's uniqueness must address.
138. 'Wittgenstein limits the use of"interpretation" to cases where we "substitut[e] ... one expression
of the rule for another." WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note I. § 201. His claim
is that at some point we make a leap from words to understanding and action. An interpretation gives us
another set of words, but ultimately we must use the set of words as the basis for behavior, no
interpretation by itself can provide that basis. See id.
139. Another implication of this view is that there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an
interpretation. Ironically, this is a strand of Wittgenstein's thought on which anti-realists focus when
explaining how the rle-following critique does not apply to legal rules. See. e.g.. Smith. supra note 16.
at 173, 183. I have tried to show that while this form of understanding cannot be used to grasp legal rules
without the aid of further interpretation, other more basic decisionmaking procedures, such as a bias built
on an ideology, can provide the motivation for understanding without interpretation.
140. See WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note I. § 241: td. at 226.
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The discussion above also suggests a third requirement on any theory of
legal correctness. In order to answer the realist challenge and remain true to
the law's unique reason-giving function, any such theory must resolve the
legitimacy problem. The force that plays the key causal role in determining the
outcomes of cases (i.e., the one that fills the gap between rules and outcomes)
must be one that can be justified as part of a theory of legal legitimacy.
Depending on one's theory of legitimacy, different justifications may be
appropriate. It may be that people have to consent to the use of this force, or
that people would consent to it behind a veil of ignorance, or that they would
consent to it given ideal circumstances for rational deliberation. However, a
theory that explains how cases are decided without providing an account of
why the decision process is justified is one that will fail to meet the realist
challenge.
To get a sense of the strength of this realist demand, it is worth noting that
most accounts of judicial decisionmaking that attempt to explain how judges
are constrained fail to meet all three requirements. For example, theories based
on neutral principles, such as those proposed by Herbert Wechsler 4' or
Robert Bork, t42 fail to meet the second requirement (that the theory not rely
on rules to explain how judges actually decide cases). These theories certainly
point in the right direction with respect to the first requirement (that the theory
be specifically tailored to the characteristics of law), insofar as they obviously
attempt to give an account sensitive to the unique characteristics of law. They
also may well meet the third requirement (that the theory justify the exercise
of power by judges), insofar as principles that are neutral are seen as
legitimate. 43 However, neutral principles appear to be rules for interpreting
legal rules, and not the kind of behavior-guiding forms of life that would serve
to fill the gap between rules and outcomes that Wittgenstein's rule-following
critique makes necessary.
Theories that focus on interpretive communities and legal
acculturation,144 or the "craft" of legal decisionmaking, 145 are also unlikely
to succeed. These theories will again meet the first requirement, as they arise
141. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I
(1959).
142. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (197 1).
143. For example, Wechsler thinks judges uniquely have to provide reasoned explanations for their
decisions. See Wechsler, supra note 141, at 15-16. Bork is also clearly interested in a theory that explains
why judicial power is legitimate. See Bork, supra note 142, at 3, 6. I take no position on whether or not
such theories can actually give an account of principles that are neutral and open to legitimation.
144. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946) (arguing that
judges come to see themselves as constrained by virtue of their role as judges). Fiss makes a similar
argument. See Fiss, supra note 13, at 744-45.
145. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 217-23 (1993) (adopting a theory of judicial and legal practice based on an Aristotelian-
inspired vision of practical wisdom); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 121-22 (1960) (describing the "horse-sense" needed to find law appropriate to particular
situations).
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out of analyses of law rather than by analogy from other disciplines. They will
also be more likely than the neutral principle theories to meet the second
requirement. Legal culture, the intuitive sense of how a case should come out,
and other similar forces may well be the sorts of forces that constitute a legal
form of life. However, such theories are very unlikely to meet the third
requirement. There is no reason to believe that a legal culture that grows up
out of the community of judges4 6 would be chosen by people, nor any
reason to believe that it would be chosen under ideal circumstances. It is also
hard to imagine a theory that could show that this culture was somehow
naturally endowed as the legitimate one for determining case outcomes.
While this treatment of the theories of legal interpretation is only
schematic and obviously far from exhaustive, some reflection on the
requirements that follow from Wittgenstein's thought should make clear that
a satisfactory theory of legal decisionmaking will be hard to construct. In
particular, although many theories may provide accurate descriptions of how
decisions are actually made, in order to answer the realist challenge they will
have to explain how judicial decisions are legitimate. I am not entirely
skeptical about the possibilities of such an account, but I believe we must
accept the possibility that the grounds for determining the correctness of legal
judgments may turn out to be produced primarily through an ideology
constructed by dominant social groups or the esoteric culture of judges, or in
some other way to be the product of forces that cannot serve as the basis for
legitimate legal decisions. For the time being, I can only remain agnostic about
the possibility of such an account. The legal realists may be wrong, but they
remain to be answered.
146. See Fiss, supra note 59, at 183.
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